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GWINDA JONES, COUNTY CLERK
ERATH COUNTY, TEXAS

By _____ *GW* Deputy

NOTICE OF COMMISSIONER'S COURT MEETING

Notice is hereby given that the Erath County Commissioner's Court will meet in regular session on Monday, November 25, 2024, at 9:00 AM in the 2nd floor Commissioner's Courtroom at the Erath County Courthouse, Stephenville, Texas, to consider the following agenda items for discussion and possible action:

1. Pledge of Allegiance.
2. Invocation.
3. Public Comments.
4. Presentation of FY 2025 Employee Benefits Comparison by ANCO Insurance.
5. Discussion and action to award Employee Health Benefits for Calendar Year 2025.
6. Discussion and action to designate the placement of a memorial bench at the Donald R. Jones Justice Center.
7. Land Development
 - a. Discussion and action regarding amendment to the plat for Country Hills Subdivision, renaming Deer Run Road and Katy Lane to Private Road 717 and Country Hills Lane to Private Road 718.
 - b. Discussion and action to approve a policy relating to Local Government Code 232.032 regarding groundwater study.
8. Discussion and action to allow PCT 2 to clear fence row on County Road 391.
9. Discussion and action to allow broken/damaged items to be destroyed and deem surplus items available for sale being stored in the Maintenance barn from various County offices.
10. Discussion and possible action on hiring a Mechanic.
11. Discussion and action to approve resolution of Support for County Motor Fuel Tax Exemption.

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Ve5mKbwTaeIVsMkTUqDION_zyjShZ6In/view?usp=drivesdk

1. All current vendor contracts - **These are not maintained by the Erath County Sheriff's Office.**
2. Data retention and deletion policies - **The only policy maintained by our office is attached.**
3. Any data-sharing agreements with other agencies - **This is not maintained by the Erath County Sheriff's Office.**
4. Audit or usage logs for the past 12 months - **These are not maintained by the Erath County Sheriff's Office, but the Flock Safety System.**
5. The policy governing who may query the system. - **The Erath County Sheriff's Office Policy regarding Automate Licensed Plate Readers is attached to this message. Please click on the link [EC SO ALPRS Policy](#).**

Records Clerk, Erath County Sheriff's Office
254-965-3338

September 2, 2026, 10:28am by Staff

Flock's Own Numbers Are Estimates Not Documented Cases

Flock claims its technology helps solve more than **700,000 crimes annually**. However, that figure is an estimate - not a documented count of 700,000 individually verified cases. Flock says it reached the number by applying a statistical framework across its customers and "estimating the totals." [1]

Flock's analysis included only **123 survey respondents with sufficient data for analysis**. Flock itself acknowledges that the results "warrant further research," particularly research examining individual crime categories and before-and-after effects. [1]

Flock also claims its technology helped law enforcement locate approximately **10,000 missing people in 2025**. But once again, the 10,000 figure is an estimate - not a documented list of 10,000 confirmed recoveries. Flock states that the figure was produced using two statistical methods and gives a confidence range of approximately **8,000 to 19,600 people**. Such a broad range shows that Flock does not know the actual number. [2]

In short: Flock promotes impressive nationwide statistics as evidence that its surveillance network works, but both the 700,000-crime figure and the 10,000-missing-person figure are estimates - not independently verified counts of cases solved by Flock. These marketing claims should not be presented to taxpayers as established facts without documentation showing the individual cases, Flock's precise role in each outcome, and independent verification of its calculations.

Sources

[1] Flock Safety, "How Many Crimes Do Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs) Solve, Anyway?" <https://www.flocksafety.com/customers/how-many-crimes-do-automated-license-plate-readers-alprs-solve-anyway>

[2] Flock Safety, "How Effective Is Flock? 2025 Impact Census Results" <https://www.flocksafety.com/blog/how-effective-is-flock>

HOW FLOCK CAMERAS & MASS AI SURVEILLANCE ARE AN INFRINGEMENT OF THE 4TH AMENDMENT

The Fourth Amendment does not permit the government to conduct indiscriminate, warrantless surveillance of the movements of every citizen merely because each individual observation occurs on a public road. Flock cameras transform isolated public observations into a persistent, searchable record of where people travel, when they travel, and with whom they associate. When government technology aggregates those observations into a detailed record of a person's movements, it can invade a reasonable expectation of privacy and implicate the Fourth Amendment.

The constitutional concern is not simply the visibility of a license plate. It is the scale, persistence, aggregation, and searchability of mass surveillance.

1. Aggregate Surveillance — Not the License Plate

A police officer standing beside a road can plainly see a license plate. That is the government's strongest counterargument. But an officer seeing a car once is fundamentally different from hundreds or thousands of automated cameras creating a database that can later reconstruct a person's movements.

That distinction follows the reasoning of *Carpenter v. United States* (2018). The Supreme Court held that the government's acquisition of historical cell-site location information was a Fourth Amendment search, emphasizing how aggregated location information can reveal an intimate window into a person's life.

Likewise, in *United States v. Jones* (2012), the Supreme Court held that attaching a GPS device to a vehicle and using it to monitor the vehicle's movements constituted a search. Separate opinions also addressed the broader privacy implications of prolonged technological monitoring.

One observation ≠ mass surveillance.

Thousands of observations aggregated into a searchable movement history may raise a fundamentally different Fourth Amendment question.

2. Automation Removes the Practical Limits That Historically Protected Privacy

Before systems like Flock existed, police could attempt to follow a person traveling on public roads. But continuous surveillance required officers, vehicles, time, coordination, and substantial expense.

Automated surveillance dramatically reduces those practical limits. A network can record observations continuously and make them searchable later. The Fourth Amendment argument is that constitutional protections should not disappear merely because technology makes widespread surveillance cheaper and easier.

In *Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle v. Baltimore Police Department* (4th Cir. 2021), the Fourth Circuit considered an aerial surveillance program capable of helping reconstruct people's movements. The court held that accessing the historical movement data implicated the Fourth Amendment. The surveillance occurred in public, making the case useful to the broader argument that aggregation can matter constitutionally.

3. Flock Can Reveal Far More Than “A Car Drove Down Main Street”

Repeated vehicle observations can potentially reveal patterns about a person's life. Depending on camera coverage, retention, data sharing, and the number of observations available, those patterns may indicate:

- where someone sleeps or regularly parks overnight
- where they work
- which doctors or clinics they visit

- which churches or houses of worship they attend
- political meetings, rallies, or protests they attend
- who they regularly visit or associate with
- when they leave home and when they return
- relationships and associations
- patterns in their daily lives

That is why the constitutional argument should emphasize patterns, aggregation, and associations rather than claiming that an individual license plate itself is private.

4. The Cameras Collect Information About People Who Are Not Suspected of a Crime

Traditional Fourth Amendment investigations generally begin with a reason to investigate a particular person, place, or offense. A mass ALPR network can reverse that sequence by collecting information broadly first and allowing investigators to search historical records later.

COLLECT EVERYONE'S MOVEMENTS FIRST → STORE THEM → DECIDE LATER WHOSE HISTORY TO SEARCH

That can be characterized as a generalized surveillance database rather than purely targeted investigation. The Fourth Amendment was shaped in significant part by the Founders' opposition to general warrants and broad, indiscriminate government searches.

5. Chatrie v. United States — Privacy in the Digital Age

In *Chatrie v. United States* (2026), the Supreme Court held that government acquisition of a citizen's digital location history constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.

The decision reinforces an important principle for the digital age: Americans retain a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy in their digital location history. Fourth Amendment protections do not simply disappear because technology makes it possible for the government to collect, aggregate, store, and search information about a person's movements.

The Court also rejected the idea that the government should receive a constitutional "grace period" simply because surveillance covers a relatively short period. The constitutional protection does not depend solely upon surveillance continuing for days, weeks, or months.

This principle is significant when considering mass AI surveillance. Modern surveillance technology can transform individual observations into aggregated, searchable location histories. The constitutional question is therefore not merely whether the government could observe someone at an individual moment, but whether technologically enabled collection and reconstruction of people's movements becomes a Fourth Amendment search requiring constitutional protection.

AMERICANS DO NOT LOSE THEIR REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY MERELY BECAUSE TECHNOLOGY MAKES MASS SURVEILLANCE EASIER.

Conclusion

The central question is not whether police may observe a vehicle on a public roadway. The question is whether government should be permitted to use automated technology to create a persistent, searchable history of the movements and associations of people who are not suspected of wrongdoing.

Supporting law enforcement and defending the Fourth Amendment are not mutually exclusive.

Law enforcement can investigate crime while constitutional safeguards continue to limit mass, suspicionless surveillance.

FLOCK CAMERAS ARE NOT THE SAME AS YOUR CELL PHONE OR RING CAMERA

WHY GOVERNMENT MASS SURVEILLANCE IS DIFFERENT

"Your cell phone tracks you anyway." That argument misses the point. Cell phones, apps, Ring cameras, and other private technologies can collect substantial amounts of information. We should care about privacy with those technologies too. But voluntarily using a private device is different from government-operated surveillance infrastructure recording vehicles traveling on public roads.

YOUR CELL PHONE

You choose to purchase and carry a cell phone. You can leave it at home, delete apps, restrict an app's location permissions, or turn Location Services off. There is an element of individual choice and control.

YOUR RING CAMERA

A homeowner chooses whether to purchase and install a Ring camera. It generally monitors a limited area around that person's property. A camera watching one property is different in scale and purpose from a government-accessible network positioned along public roads. Ring states that it generally requires properly served, legally binding government demands before providing user information, subject to limited exceptions such as emergencies.

FLOCK CAMERAS

You don't choose whether a FLOCK camera records your vehicle. You don't download an app, click "I Agree," grant location permission, or have to be suspected of committing a crime. You simply drive past the camera. According to Flock Safety's LPR policy, its system can collect license plate and vehicle images, vehicle characteristics, plate number and state, date, time, and camera location. Authorized users can search the information. Flock also states that customers control authorized access and sharing and that searches are logged.

THE ISSUE ISN'T ONE LICENSE PLATE

Nobody seriously argues that a police officer standing beside the highway cannot see your license plate. The concern is what technology makes possible when individual observations are collected, stored, searched, and potentially shared.

ONE OBSERVATION IS NOT THE SAME AS A SEARCHABLE NETWORK OF OBSERVATIONS.

"BUT YOU'RE IN PUBLIC."

Being visible in public should not automatically mean consenting to having your movements placed into a searchable government database. There is a major difference between BEING SEEN and BEING SYSTEMATICALLY RECORDED, STORED & SEARCHED.

THIS IS ABOUT GOVERNMENT POWER

You can throw away your smartphone. You can uninstall an app. You can turn off location permissions. You can remove your Ring camera. You cannot opt out of a government road camera simply by exercising those choices.

HOW MUCH POWER SHOULD GOVERNMENT HAVE TO RECORD AND SEARCH THE MOVEMENTS OF PEOPLE WHO ARE NOT SUSPECTED OF A CRIME?

PUBLIC SAFETY MATTERS. SO DOES PRIVACY.

We should be able to pursue one without surrendering the other.

Sources: Flock Safety LPR Usage and Privacy Policy; Apple Location Services & Privacy; Ring Law Enforcement Information Requests.

“Businesses Already Have Cameras Everywhere — So Why Object to Flock?”

Why ordinary private security cameras are fundamentally different from taxpayer-funded, searchable automated license-plate surveillance

The Core Difference

A camera mounted over a store entrance and a government-operated automated license plate reader (ALPR) may both take pictures, but they are not functionally equivalent. The important questions are what is collected, how systematically it is collected, whether it is indexed and searchable, who can access it, how it can be shared, and whether taxpayers are financing the system.

1. A Business Camera Usually Watches a Place; Flock Catalogs Passing Vehicles

A conventional business security camera is generally installed to document activity at a particular property: a doorway, register, parking lot, fuel pump, or other limited area. Reviewing ordinary footage often requires knowing approximately when and where an event occurred.

Flock's own privacy materials state that its ALPR system captures license-plate images, vehicle characteristics, date/time stamps, and camera location. Those fields turn an image into structured information that can be searched later. Flock also states that its ALPR does not collect facial-recognition or driver information.

2. Searchability Changes the Nature of Surveillance

The distinction is not simply 'camera versus camera.' It is isolated video versus a system designed to retrieve vehicle observations. A store camera might show that a vehicle happened to enter one parking lot. A network of ALPR cameras can create multiple timestamped observations of the same plate at different camera locations, depending on where cameras are deployed and what data is accessible to the searching agency.

The ACLU describes ALPR systems as collecting plate number, date, time, and location and warns that pooled records can create databases of motorists' location information. This illustrates why critics focus on aggregation and searchability rather than the mere existence of cameras.

3. Private Security and Government Surveillance Raise Different Accountability Questions

A private business purchasing cameras with private funds is making a property-security decision. When a sheriff's office, police department, city, or county purchases an ALPR network with public money, taxpayers are funding a government investigative capability. That creates legitimate questions for elected officials about necessity, proportionality, written policies, authorized users, auditing, retention, sharing, and remedies for misuse.

This does not mean government can never use cameras or that private businesses have unlimited freedom to record. It means the government's purpose, authority, scale, and accountability are materially different from those of an ordinary storefront camera.

4. Retention Creates a Historical Record

Flock's current Evidence Policy states that its default retention period for license-plate-reader data is 30 days, after which the data is hard-deleted from the cloud. Flock says longer retention of up to one year can be offered when an agency obtains approval from an elected official and/or governing body, subject to applicable law. Because records remain searchable during the retention period, investigators may be able to query past vehicle observations rather than merely respond to a live event.

5. Network Sharing Is a Policy Choice — and That Choice Matters

It would be inaccurate to say that every agency automatically receives every Flock customer's data. Flock currently says each agency controls its own access and sharing settings and that sharing is optional. Flock also describes possible sharing arrangements including one-to-one agency sharing, geographic-radius sharing, statewide sharing, and, when selected by the customer, nationwide sharing.

That actually strengthens the case for public oversight: elected officials and taxpayers should know what their local agency has enabled, with whom it shares, what outside searches are permitted, and how those decisions are audited.

Flock Falcon vs. a Basic License Plate Reader

Why Falcon Capabilities Can Raise Greater Fourth Amendment Concerns

The key Fourth Amendment concern is not simply that a Flock Falcon photographs a publicly visible license plate. The concern is that Falcon technology can make vehicle observations richer, searchable, historical, and useful across a network of cameras.

Basic LPR vs. Flock Falcon

- **Basic/ordinary LPR:** Primarily answers: “What license plate passed this camera at this time?”
- **Flock Falcon:** Can associate a detection with a plate, vehicle image and characteristics, date/time, and camera location, and can support searches using vehicle characteristics even when the full plate is not known.

Capabilities That Increase the Privacy Concern

- **Vehicle characteristics:** Falcon searches can use characteristics such as vehicle make/model, color, body type, and distinctive visible features. This can allow investigators to narrow down vehicles without beginning with a known license plate.
- **Historical searching:** Falcon detections can be retained for a period of time. Investigators may therefore search past observations after a person or vehicle becomes of interest instead of having to follow that vehicle beforehand.
- **Location and time records:** Each detection can establish that a particular vehicle was observed at a particular camera location at a particular time.
- **Networked observations:** When detections from multiple cameras or participating agencies are available, separate sightings can reveal patterns in a vehicle’s movements across locations and potentially across jurisdictions.
- **Automated scale:** A human officer can observe only a limited number of vehicles. A network of cameras can automatically document very large numbers of ordinary vehicle movements and make those observations searchable.
- **Broader searches:** Investigators do not necessarily have to begin with a specific plate number. Searching by vehicle description can potentially include vehicles belonging to people who were not previously identified as suspects.

Bottom Line

A traditional LPR reads a plate. A Falcon system can turn vehicle observations into a searchable historical data set. The Fourth Amendment concern grows when ordinary movements of people who are not suspected of crimes can be collected first and investigated later.

FLOCK VEHICLE FINGERPRINT® & THE 4TH AMENDMENT

Why communities are questioning mass, searchable vehicle surveillance

More than a license-plate reader

Flock's Vehicle Fingerprint technology uses machine learning to make vehicle observations searchable beyond the plate number. Depending on the product and available image, searches can use characteristics such as make/model, color, plate/state and distinctive visible features, together with the time and location of a sighting.

- Search a vehicle by descriptive characteristics even when investigators do not begin with a complete plate number.
- Create alerts for vehicles on hot lists or matching specified investigative criteria.
- Search historical sightings by place and time and connect observations from multiple cameras.
- Use networked data-sharing to extend searches beyond a single camera or jurisdiction, depending on agency permissions.
- Flock also markets analytical tools such as Location-Based Search and Convoy Analysis.

Why this raises a Fourth Amendment question

A single observation of a vehicle on a public road is not automatically an unconstitutional search. The concern is the scale and aggregation: a dense network can potentially turn thousands of separate public-road observations into a searchable history of a vehicle's movements. Critics argue that prolonged, retrospective tracking can reveal sensitive associations and locations and begins to resemble dragnet surveillance.

The Supreme Court's location-tracking cases, including *Carpenter v. United States* and *United States v. Jones*, recognize that prolonged or aggregated tracking can raise Fourth Amendment concerns. Those cases did not decide the constitutionality of Flock ALPR networks specifically, so it is more accurate to say widespread Flock surveillance raises a serious and still-developing Fourth Amendment issue—not that every Flock search has already been ruled unconstitutional.

Officials are already walking away

These concerns are not merely theoretical. Local governments and law-enforcement officials around the country have canceled, declined to renew, disabled, or restricted Flock systems amid privacy, mass-surveillance, oversight and Fourth Amendment concerns.

- Hood County, Texas: Commissioners ended the county's Flock agreement; the cameras were later covered and unplugged amid privacy and mass-surveillance concerns.
- Kendall County, Texas: Commissioners voted unanimously not to renew Flock, citing privacy, data access/sharing and oversight concerns.
- New Hanover County, North Carolina: Commissioners unanimously canceled the stationary Flock ALPR portion of the county contract after concerns that included privacy, oversight, abuse and ongoing constitutional challenges.
- Pinal County, Arizona: the sheriff announced the county would not renew its Flock contract, with reporting citing Fourth Amendment concerns.
- Marshall County, Indiana: commissioners stopped automatic renewal while reviewing data privacy and Fourth Amendment protections.

The central question

When does observing a car on a public road become government tracking of a person's movements? Flock's scale, AI-assisted searching, historical location data and cross-jurisdictional reach are why some officials and residents believe these systems can cross the line from targeted investigation into constitutionally problematic dragnet surveillance.

Sources: Flock Safety product materials; Texas Public Radio/KERA (Hood County, Aug. 19, 2026); San Antonio Express-News/MySA (Kendall County, Aug. 2026); WHQR/Carolina Journal (New Hanover County, Sept. 2026); reporting on Pinal County and Marshall County; *Carpenter v. United States*, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018); *United States v. Jones*, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).




FLOCK: MORE HARM THAN GOOD?

**Fourth Amendment concerns.
Documented misuse and abuse.
Wrongful detentions and wrongful arrests.**



Without independent, verified data showing how many cases Flock actually helps solve, we cannot rule out the possibility that its surveillance system is enabling more harm than it prevents.



WE DESERVE PROOF, NOT MARKETING CLAIMS.

Flock and ALPR Abuse Cases and Reported Totals

Reporting cutoff October 13 2026

Each search used to commit stalking or criminal harassment is a criminal act made possible by access to Flock and other ALPR systems.

These lists compile reported abuse cases involving harassment, stalking, tracking former partners, and unauthorized searches for personal reasons.

Approximately 70,283 reported improper searches across 35 cases

This is an approximate subtotal of reported figures, not an exhaustive national total.

Person and location	Reported improper searches
Zachary Klein — Lufkin TX	More than 25,000
James Heneghan — Hancock County IN	More than 6,190
Gabriel Garcia — Kingsville TX	About 5,300
Michael Rogers — Indianapolis IN	More than 4,400
Sierra Carroll — Houston County GA	At least 4,018
Laurie Moore — Albany County NY	More than 4,000
Nathan Rome — Jefferson Parish LA	More than 3,000
Ruben Carter — Colleton County SC	More than 2,700
Asad Zahir — Shively KY	2,048
Skylar Thompson — Jackson County IN	About 2,000
Jonathan Schultz — Indianapolis IN	1,396
Cassandra Crawley — Indianapolis IN	1,270
Heidi Taylor — Dallas GA	About 1,200
Jose Ferrer — Richmond County GA	At least 1,146
Matthew Binford — Indianapolis IN	More than 1,000
James Keinard — Braselton GA	At least 891

Reported improper searches continued

Person and location	Reported improper searches
Emily Pacheco — New Bedford MA	887
Christopher Goodson — Haines City FL	717
Michael Steffman — Braselton GA	About 600
Abigail Cramer — Indianapolis IN	More than 400
Joseph Crutchfield — Fort Pierce FL	382
Cory Waiters — Sarasota FL	358
William Copp — Prairie Grove and Holiday Hills IL	Nearly 250
Lee Nygaard — Sedgwick KS	228
Coty Hall — Niceville FL	192
Josue Ayala — Milwaukee WI	179
Ellie Hammond — Mauldin SC	At least 166
Oscar Maldonado — Naperville IL	About 150
James Marinelli — New Bedford MA	87
Christian Eder — Amarillo TX	76
Jeffery Bornes — Kokomo IN	18
Frank McGrath — Kenosha County WI	16 to 17
Jason Orellana — Hall County GA	10
Cristian Morales — Menasha WI	7
Gerardo Solis — West Chicago IL	At least 1
Approximate subtotal	70,283

Additional abuse cases at IJ ORG

Additional reported abuse cases and original source links can be found at IJ.ORG, where the Institute for Justice maintains its database of ALPR abuse, including stalking, searches unrelated to law enforcement, and other misconduct.

The IJ Database of ALPR Abuse

<https://ij.org/the-ij-database-of-alpr-abuse/>

Separate totals and qualifications

The supplied compilation also lists the following separate categories. These figures are not added to the 70,283 search subtotal.

Reported criminal counts in the broader misuse ledger

982 across 82 defendants

Additional figures needing qualification including mixed databases, access events, or searches not all established as improper

22,373 plus one reported range

Unauthorized outside agency dataset queries in San Francisco and Ventura County

More than 1,964,000

How the search subtotal was calculated

Figures described as more than or at least use the stated number as a baseline. Rounded figures remain approximate. The subtotal uses 16 for the reported range of 16 to 17. Criminal charges are counted separately from searches.

Evidence for the comparison

There is no verified information proving that Flock or other ALPR systems have helped solve more cases than the number of crimes made possible through Flock and ALPR misuse.

Comparison sources reviewed October 27, 2026

Institute for Justice — Do Flock cameras actually reduce crime The jury is still out

<https://ij.org/do-flock-cameras-actually-reduce-crime-the-jury-is-still-out/>

Sources and scope

Case names, locations, and totals are reproduced from the supplied Flock Misuse and Reported Totals compilation, with a reporting cutoff of October 13, 2026. The underlying source documents identified in that compilation are:

Reported Flock and ALPR Misuse Searches — Case inventory and published search totals.

Flock and ALPR Misuse Cases and Reported Totals.

The Institute for Justice database provides additional case descriptions and links to reporting. It covers Flock and other ALPR systems. Listing a case does not establish that every allegation resulted in a conviction.

<https://ij.org/the-ij-database-of-alpr-abuse/>

Flock Records and Risks to Families

Members of the public—including pedophiles and sexual predators—can request Flock-related public records. Texas law generally bars agencies from asking why someone wants records and requires equal treatment of requests. That makes the handling of sensitive records a serious concern for families with children. [1]

A dangerous record of everyday life

Flock records where vehicles are seen and when. Put enough sightings together, and they can show parts of a family's routine. If records released through open-records requests reveal those details, a stalker or pedophile could use them to follow or harass families with children. This is the danger of collecting information about ordinary people's daily lives.

Texas Government Code §552.223 requires requests to be handled uniformly, regardless of the requester's position, occupation, past criminal history, who they represent or media status. Section 552.222(b) generally bars agencies from asking what the information will be used for. A history of sexual assault against children does not, by itself, bar someone from submitting a public-information request. These sections do not expressly mention criminal history; the point is that the request process is not a screening test for good intentions. Texas separately allows agencies to only decline requests from incarcerated people under §552.028. These provisions govern requests, not which specific Erath County Flock records have been released. [1]

The Sheriff's Office owes residents answers

In its written response, the Erath County Sheriff's Office said it did not keep the requested audit or usage logs—the Flock Safety System kept them. The office also said it did not keep the requested vendor contracts or agreements about sharing data with other agencies. [3]

Those answers do not explain who checks for abuse, how often searches are checked, or what information is given to people who request records. Residents should not have to chase a private company for answers about a surveillance system used by their own Sheriff's Office.

Families with children deserve more than unanswered questions. The Sheriff's Office should show exactly how it prevents stalking, harassment and improper release of records. Saying that Flock keeps the logs does not show that anyone locally is checking them.

Sources

[1] Texas Government Code §§552.028, 552.222(b) and 552.223; Texas Attorney General, 2026 Public Information Act Handbook: <https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/files/divisions/open-government/PIA-Handbook-2026.pdf>

[2] Texas DPS, License Plate Reader Privacy Impact Assessment: https://www.dps.texas.gov/administration/crime_records/pages/LPRPIA.pdf

[3] Erath County Sheriff's Office written records response shown in the supplied screenshot. Response date not verified.

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Kentucky Gov. Andy Beshear is receiving pushback from Republicans about his plan to record the license plate numbers of people who attend church services on Easter and have them quarantined afterward.


“Taking license plates at church? Quarantining someone for being Christian on Easter Sunday? Someone needs to take a step back here,” Sen. Rand Paul tweeted Friday night.

Beshear said Friday afternoon that Kentucky State Police troopers would be collecting the license plate information of people attending “mass gatherings” this weekend. He said local health departments would then notify those people that they need to quarantine at home for 14 days.

[HOME](#) > [THE STATE](#)



Why does the USDA want you to add your local vegetable garden to a national database?



“ The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the life-changing power of the Internet. Digital technology has saved lives by enabling millions of people to work, study and socialise safely online. But the pandemic has also magnified the digital divide, and the dark side of technology: the lightning-fast spread of misinformation; the manipulation of people’s behaviour; and more. We can only address these challenges united, through strengthened cooperation: by establishing clear rules to safeguard human rights and fundamental freedoms; by regaining control over our data; by countering disinformation and hate speech.”

Secretary-General's video message for the Opening Session of the 16th Internet Governance Forum: "Internet United"
December 7, 2021

Texas Republican Platform on Surveillance

Six adopted 2026 platform provisions and their legal status

Conclusion All six surveillance and privacy provisions listed below were adopted as part of the 2026 Republican Party of Texas Platform. Their adoption establishes official party policy, but it does not by itself create Texas law.

Six adopted platform provisions

Plank	Provision	What it says
55	Ban Automated License Plate Readers	Calls for government ALPR systems, including Flock Safety and TxDOT vehicle-tracking cameras, to be prohibited and existing systems removed. Vehicle-tracking data should not be collected, retained, or shared without a probable-cause warrant.
61	Artificial Intelligence Protections	Recognizes individual ownership of personally identifiable information and supports notice, consent, and the right to opt out of data collection or use.
62	Personal Data Privacy	Opposes state and local government vendors selling or sharing data collected while providing services to Texans and supports limits on access to electronic communications and documents.
168	Government Surveillance	Opposes warrantless government surveillance in all forms and at every level of government against United States citizens and businesses.
170	Location and Data Privacy	Calls for a probable-cause warrant or legally obtained subpoena before government access to current or historical technologically available location data.
201	Identity Theft and Data Privacy	Calls for limits on how government entities and others access, collect, store, and use Texans' electronic communications, documents, metadata, and protected information.

Platform adoption and Texas law

Passed as party policy All six provisions were approved through the Republican Party of Texas convention process and appear in the final approved 2026 platform.

Not automatically enacted as law A party platform states the party's official positions and directs its elected officials, but it is not a statute. The platform's specific statewide prohibition on Flock and other government ALPR systems has not been enacted into Texas law as of September 16, 2026.

Timing The 2026 platform was adopted after the 2025 regular legislative session. Legislation implementing Plank 55 would ordinarily be considered during the 2027 Legislature unless addressed during a special session.

Source [2026 Republican Party of Texas Platform and Resolutions](#)